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Streams of Consciousness
Alumit Ishai
When investigating the neural correlates of conscious-
ness, neuroscientists distinguish between ‘‘conscious
state’’ (being awake as opposed to asleep or in a coma),
which is regulated by brainstem and thalamic nuclei, and
‘‘conscious representation’’ (awareness of specific phe-
nomenal experience). The advent of functional brain
imaging techniques, especially fMRI, enables the non-
invasive inquiries of the mechanisms underlying con-
scious experience, particularly in the visual system. To
date, most experimental paradigms designed to study
consciousness contrast the response during conscious
visual experience with the response during unconscious
visual experience (the so-called blindsight phenomen-
on), or record patterns of brain activation during binoc-
ular rivalry, perception of bistable figures, and visual
mental imagery. The current data suggest that activity in
high-level areas of the ventral visual pathway, but not in
V1, are necessary for conscious visual experience. More-
over, visual awareness requires parietal and prefrontal
regions (for a recent review, see Rees, Kreiman, & Koch,
2002). The neural correlates of conscious vision, there-
fore, parallel the distributed cortical networks that mod-
ulate visual attention and visual imagery. As most
researchers confuse ‘‘awareness’’ with ‘‘consciousness,’’
the reported differential activity during consciousness is
currently indistinguishable from that of other higher
cognitive functions.
In his article, ‘‘Functional fMRI and the Study of
Human Consciousness,’’ Dan Lloyd uniquely combines
a conceptual analysis of consciousness with neuroscien-
tific methods, in order to characterize the neural man-
ifestations of consciousness (Lloyd, 2002). Lloyd adopts
Husserl’s criteria, according to which the phenome-
nology of consciousness is based on three essential
principles: intentionality (the external world as it is
experienced and not as it is); superposition (sensory
and nonsensory properties are present in perception);
and temporality (all objects share perception of
present, past, and anticipated future). If indeed these
aspects of consciousness are implemented in the brain,
the empirical evidence should include temporal flux
(with passing time, the multivariate differences between
images should increase) and superposition (images
sharing task or stimulus conditions should be similar).
Lloyd’s methodological approach includes three con-
straints. First, time points in a scan series are consid-
ered individually, because temporality implies that
consciousness at each point in time is distinct from
the preceding and the proceeding points. Second,
subjects are considered individually, because intersub-
ject averaging could eliminate individual expression of
consciousness. Finally, brain states are considered glob-
ally, seeking distributed patterns of activation that
encompass large cortical areas, rather than assuming
localized responses.
To test his predictions, Lloyd reanalyzes four data sets
(Hazeltine, Poldrack, & Gabrieli, 2000; Ishai, Ungerleider,
Martin, & Haxby, 2000; Mechelli, Friston, & Price, 2000;
Postle, Berger, Taich, & D’Esposito, 2000) provided by
The fMRI Data Center. The studies, published in the
December 2000 issue of the Journal of Cognitive Neuro-
science, included a variety of cognitive tasks (target
tracking, passive viewing, delayed matching, reading,
and spatial working memory), stimuli (faces, objects,
words, pseudowords, 2-D arrays of squares, colored
circles), and motor responses (button presses and sac-
cades). Needless to say, none of the original studies was
designed for or aimed at underpinning the neural mech-
anisms of ‘‘neurophenomenology.’’ Nevertheless, Lloyd
preprocesses and reanalyzes the raw data to test his
predictions about the general structures of conscious-
ness, which by their nature are task and stimulus inde-
pendent. Using multivariate distance analysis and
artificial neural networks, he shows a time–distance
effect (i.e., as the time series progressed, the distance
between images increased) and that the past and future
brain states, retention and protention, respectively, are
embedded in present brain states. As time passes, sug-
gests Lloyd, the brain is changing ‘‘globally, incremen-
tally, and monotonically.’’
Previous fMRI studies of consciousness compared one
state of awareness with another, assumed localization,
and ignored the temporal flux. Lloyd’s original approach
proposes methodological and conceptual advantages.
Traditionally, fMRI data analysis focused on two param-
eters, namely the spatial extent of the activation and the
amplitude of the response within an activated region.
The data are usually displayed as statistical maps indicat-
ing the location and size of significant activation, and
graphs or histograms showing the percent fMRI signal
change. Given the spatial and temporal resolution of the
technique, extracting temporal information about the
‘‘tripartite temporality’’ (i.e., the experienced present ofNational Institutes of Health
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an object is influenced by the past and the future) is
problematic. The hemodynamic function presents a
serious challenge, as each time point is contaminated
by the immediately preceding response. Lloyd’s correc-
tion—that is, excluding 10 seconds before and after each
time point—is thus necessary. Moreover, he trains arti-
ficial neural networks to reconstruct the temporal in-
formation encoded in each time point. In all subjects,
the neural networks succeeded in recovering informa-
tion about the preceding volume (retention) and the
following volume (protention). Lloyd assumes distrib-
uted patterns of activation (Ishai, Ungerleider, Martin,
Schouten, & Haxby, 1999; Ishai et al., 2000); however,
his current analysis does not include spatial localization.
Further investigation is therefore required to determine
which brain regions mediate the temporal manifesta-
tions of consciousness.
Lloyd’s finding that performance is better when the
network recovered information about the past than the
future was perhaps not surprising, due to the asymmetry
between the known immediate past and the unknown
future. One could assume, however, that ‘‘top–down’’
effects such as expectation, anticipation, and attention
should modulate ‘‘future’’ patterns of activation. For
example, Kastner, Pinsk, De Weerd, Desimone, & Unger-
leider (1999) have shown that in the absence of a
sensory stimulus, anticipation modulated the response
within both sensory and control areas. Furthermore,
when subjects are engaged in a block design experiment
with predicted context, for example, while viewing chair
stimuli for several seconds, they expect to see a new
chair as the next stimulus, be it a rocking chair or an
office chair, but definitely do not expect an object of a
different category such as a table or a face. It is highly
likely that under certain experimental conditions, the
neural correlates of protention could also be detected.
Task-dependent analysis of the temporal structures of
consciousness is therefore inevitable.
Lloyd is not looking for the loci of consciousness, nor
does he identify regions of interest in the human brain.
Rather, he analytically defines the characteristic features
of consciousness, and tests whether distributed patterns
of activation that mediate the phenomenal structures of
consciousness could be detected. Because conscious
awareness is implicated in all cognitive functions, he
utilizes data sets from four different cognitive studies
and ‘‘stripped’’ them of their specific experimental de-
tails. These independent and unrelated studies did have
something in common: they used the fMRI technique
and their data sets were (and still are) available at the
fMRI Data Center. The fMRI Data Center was established
to provide a publicly accessible repository of peer-re-
viewed fMRI studies and their accompanying data in
order to facilitate understanding of cognitive processes
and the underlying neural substrates. Since January
2001, the fMRI Data Center has received more than 50
complete data sets that include all the information
necessary to interpret, analyze, and replicate those fMRI
studies. Lloyd, a philosopher from Trinity College in
Hartford, successfully demonstrates how one could
empirically investigate the neural manifestations of
structures of consciousness, concepts that were pro-
posed more than 100 years ago, by reanalyzing existing
data sets.
‘‘We can not step in the same stream of consciousness
twice,’’ writes Lloyd. His award-winning article has
shown that we could step in the same data set twice
to shed new light on human cognition, as ‘‘upon those
that step into the same rivers different waters flow’’
(Heraclitus, fragment 12).
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